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Abstract 
While the impact of the Troubles retains centrality within much of Northern Irish political life, 
the spectre of almost daily violence is becoming a more distant memory. Peace has come to the 
region. In spite of this, however, there are those who wish to maintain the utility of violence to 
achieve their stated aims. Most dominant amongst these are the violent dissident republican 
groups. No longer is their existence solely defined by their desire to bring about a united Ireland. 
In order to have any opportunity of longevity, they must first legitimise their continued 
existence, and in turn distance themselves from their former Provisional comrades. This paper 
assesses how groups, such as the Continuity IRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann and the IRA/New IRA 
utilise the lessons learned from their Provisional history to differentiate themselves from the 
politicised dominance of Sinn Féin. This evaluation is carried out through the analysis of 
interviews with leadership and rank and file members of both political and paramilitary dissident 
groupings, which is complimented by the analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) 
events database. These sources are supplemented with the assessment of organisational 
statements, from 2007 to the present day. The article focuses on violent, and non-violent, 
learning.  
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Introduction 
The coming period should…see a new stage in the national independence struggle, one in 
which the lessons of the past will have been studied and learned and which will carry the 
independence struggle to a successful conclusion by establishing in Ireland a united, 
democratic republic, politically and economically independent, and governed for the 
benefit of the people. (Sinn Féin, The Lessons of History, 1970) 1 
In 1969/70 the Irish Republican Movement went through a movement defining change. With the 
tensions in Northern Ireland escalating it had its own internal battles on a variety of issues 
ranging from abstentionism2 to socialism, to the continued utility of armed force. Coupled with 
the external political environment, these arguments and debates ultimately led to the split in the 
movement, that saw the birth of Provisional IRA (PIRA).3 While the division and the resultant 
re-emergence of paramilitary republicanism are pinpointed to single moments in time, these are 
in fact the results of extended processes of debate, fragmentation and organisational 
introspection. In the lead up to this and other splits, the leadership question the future trajectory 
of the movement and ask themselves what lessons can be learned from the past. In this particular 
split this is most clearly illustrated within the internal document The Lessons of History, that was 
first published in September 1967, and subsequently updated in February 1969, and reprinted by 
Official Sinn Féin in the immediate aftermath of the political split in February 1970. The present 
article opened with the closing words of the paper, calling on the members to learn from the 
lessons of history in this new stage of their revolutionary struggle. Within the document it states 
that the history of Irish republicanism has taken four distinct forms; theoretical thought, an 
organised „body of men‟ willing to take up arms, the revolution of the „men of no property‟ and 
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the disturbance of governable imperialism. Through the analysis of republican history, the 
authors argued that the absence of any of these four factors would render a revolution 
unsuccessful, but that the presence of each is no guarantee for success.4 This form of 
organisational introspection can be witnessed throughout the history of the Irish Republican 
Movement, and is often used as a means to legitimise the continued armed or politicised 
existence of various strata of the fragmented movement, while delegitimising republican rivals 
concurrently. The process of learning lessons from organisational history is continuously used to 
justify an individual organisation‟s independence from their republican rivals. While this was 
clearly witnessed at the dawn of the Troubles in 1969, it can once again be observed today.  
With the Provisional Republican Movement now at peace, the beginning of the twenty-first 
century has seen a range of organisations attempting to take on their mantle of paramilitary 
republicanism. Prominent amongst these have been the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Real IRA 
(RIRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) and more recently the „IRA/New IRA. Collectively these 
groups are referred to as the violent dissident republicans (VDR), due to their dissent towards 
and separation from the politicisation of the „mainstream‟ Republican Movement embodied by 
modern-day Sinn Féin. The defining feature of these groups‟ existence is their attempt to spoil 
the peace process,5 and return Northern Ireland to the dark days of the Troubles. They have 
attempted to achieve this through the application of protest, localised violent vigilantism and, 
most prominently, nationalised terrorism. Every strata of Northern Irish society has fallen victim 
to their on-going paramilitary activity.6 Through their utility of violence and protest the VDR 
groups are acting as spoilers,7 while simultaneously attempting to outbid8 each other in order to 
achieve dissident prominence.  
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By acting as spoilers they are attempting to dismantle the politicised peace, which is now seen 
throughout Northern Ireland. They are attempting to do this through their murders, and attempted 
murders, of Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and prison officers, attacks on the security 
services, bombings of commercial properties, and the ever-present punishment attacks and 
vigilante murders within the nationalist and republican neighbourhoods of Northern Ireland. 
They are united in their division, from Sinn Féin and the peace process. However, they are 
divided in this unity. The sustained fragmentation of the dissident community, both violent and 
non-violent, has meant that they have seen themselves to be in competition with each other. This 
is a competition for legitimisation, to be the „true‟ and most competent voice within the dissident 
community. This has seen the groups attempt to outbid one another, in order to show that they 
are the ones who will be able to achieve a united Ireland through paramilitary force. This is a 
competition for both membership and support, being fought within dissident republicanism but 
also against Sinn Féin.  
The paucity of VDR actors, the continued fragmentation, and resultant internal competition for 
support has traditionally led to significantly weakened organisations. These groups have been 
weak across a range of fronts, most notably support, membership, paramilitary capabilities, 
financing and legitimacy. These weaknesses have unsurprisingly resulted in an inability to 
successfully spoil the peace process, or mount a significant challenge to the republican 
prominence of Sinn Féin. In reaction to this in 2012 it was announced that RIRA, Republican 
Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and other disparate and previously unaligned dissidents had 
merged to form a new group, under the all-encompassing title of „The IRA‟, 9  otherwise known 
as the New IRA (hereafter IRA/New IRA). By merging they were attempting to provide a 
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unified dissident force, with the ability of mounting a significant paramilitary campaign and 
challenging Sinn Féin for support. In the years since their inception, they have become the most 
violently active of the VDR groups. Through their actions and statements, similar to the other 
remaining VDR groups, they are aiming to present themselves as the legitimate heirs to the 
armed republican traditions of the revolutionaries of the 1916 Easter Rising, and beyond. This 
pursuit for legitimacy has become particularly relevant, with the centenary of the Rising being 
commemorated in 2016.  
The present article aims to assess how learning has helped shape the strategies, tactics and the 
ultimate legitimisation of the VDR groups wishing to maintain the armed struggle. It does so by 
amalgamating the data and analysis from three separate on-going projects. The first of these 
analyses splits in paramilitary and political republicanism from 1916 to the present day. Within 
this research 43 leadership and rank and file members of the Irish Republican Movement, both 
dissident and mainstream, were interviewed to assess their understanding of why and how the 
splits took place, as well as detailing their own personal choices during these processes. Their 
interviews were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA).10 The second 
research project relates to a database of VDR activity and personnel. This database was 
developed and maintained using exclusively open source data, and displays the demographic 
details of those who have been convicted and charged of VDR activity from 1994 to the present 
day. It also hosts event specific information, in relation to VDR activity across the same period.11 
Both of these are complimented by the final project, that relates to the collection and analysis of 
VDR statements from 2007 to the present day. These statements are analysed using grounded 
theory.12 Each of these projects are analysed to assess the role which learning has played for the 
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modern-day VDR groups. By pooling the findings from each of these three projects, it allows for 
the assessment of learning in relation to tactics, strategies and organisational evolution.13 The 
majority of this article focuses on the process of internal learning within Irish republicanism. 
However, prior to this analysis there is firstly an introduction to the broader republican history of 
both external and internal learning 
External Learning 
Throughout the history of Irish republicanism learning has played a significant role, in the 
evolution of the movement. This relates to the simultaneous political and paramilitary 
campaigns. Groups have learned from internal experiences, as well as the history of the 
movement, as is clearly illustrated in with the publication of The Lessons of History.14 This 
internal learning has repeatedly been supplemented, through the external learning from 
international political and paramilitary revolutionaries. It is repeatedly referenced that the French 
Revolution, which was coming to a close, heavily influenced the 1798 Rebellion, led by 
Theobald Wolfe Tone.15 This tradition of learning from, and being inspired by, external groups 
has continued across each generation of Irish Republican groups since. This is most apparent 
during the Troubles. The need for expanding tactical expertise led the Provisional IRA, and other 
republican groups, to seek direct training from international allies to compliment their own 
internal training. This saw the PIRA receive training, as well as weapons and explosives, from 
Libya.16 In the 1970s it is also widely believed that both the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA), and the PIRA, received training in Palestine from the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO).17 These training camps helped the members to develop their skills of guerrilla warfare, as 
well as learn new techniques. The internationalisation of the armed struggle, and their training, 
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was not only used to acquire skills. It was also utilised as propaganda material, to promote the 
professionalism and connections the groups were forming. In their seminal analysis of the INLA, 
Holland and McDonald discuss how the group carried a front-page story in their publication 
Starry Plough, detailing and displaying INLA members in training across Northern Ireland. One 
of the pictures showed a member preparing himself to throw a hand grenade brought back 
through PLO contacts in the Middle East. This article was juxtaposed with another expressing 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause. These articles combined displayed to readers the 
importance of the international dimension of their campaign, both from a training and supply 
perspective but also in terms of international solidarity.18 
This international influence did not always come directly from the source. Irish Republicans 
regularly learned from their own interpretations of international conflicts, and armed rebellions. 
This was evident during the imprisonment of republican paramilitaries,19 as well as within their 
external training camps. Historically republicans have used their incarceration as an opportunity 
to learn, about their own and other‟s experiences. This is most readily seen during the Troubles, 
where the prisoners used their custody as a time to attend classes and training sessions.20 This 
was designed to prepare them for their release, when they would return to their roles with the 
IRA and/or Sinn Féin. Former Provisional prisoner Richard McAuley details this: 
“So part of the camp dealt with training people in the use of weapons, or engineering, or 
whatever.  Other parts of the camp dealt with political lectures, much of it drawn from the 
international experience as well as from the Irish experience, Cuba, Algeria, The Israelis 
and the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Brits in 47, Vietnam, all of that was thrown into 
the mix as we tried at one level to understand what the Brits were at particularly around 
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criminalisation, Ulsterisation and normalisation and what that actually meant and how it 
applied and how they were copying from other situations and then what we needed to do 
about it.”21  
As is displayed above, the tactical learning was complimented by the invocation of the 
leadership for their members to also learn from external political campaigns. As it was clear that 
the Provisional movement was gradually politicising, and moving away from their paramilitary 
campaign, these lessons not only concentrated on traditional revolutionary campaigns. Members 
were also called upon to assess how Irish republicanism could also utilise the lessons of purely 
political struggles for independence. In the lead up to the August 1994 PIRA ceasefire influential 
leaders were entering the prisons, to „sell‟ the importance of a politically led campaign to the 
prisoners. In doing so they called upon the prisoners to use their time inside, to learn from the 
then burgeoning Scottish campaign for independence. Joe Doherty explains. 
 
“I remember even McGuinness saying „look at Scotland. Scotland is going to have an 
impact in the future.‟ Look now the SNP have taken power and they reckon that maybe 
within the next ten years Scotland will be independent. That‟s going to fragment. 
McGuinness was saying „look at that, read into it lads. Youse are in prison, youse are 
republicans youse are not blind, youse are open. Study it, analyse it.‟ And that‟s what we 
did. You know then there is other people who don‟t go down that road. They think going 
down that road is going to be total reformist.”22 
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Internal Learning 
This externally focused learning was always complimented by an introspection of their own 
former, and current, campaigns. This related to the tactics and strategies promoted by the groups, 
as well as the policy positions taken. During the evolution of the Irish Republican Movement, 
from a paramilitary organisation to the politicised movement, we see a continued emphasis on 
learning the lessons of the past. This can be seen both pre and post 1969. In the lead-up to the 
Troubles in 1969, the IRA and Sinn Féin was going through a time of transition. They were 
emerging from the „Border Campaign‟23 of the late 1950s and early 1960s, that was widely 
deemed to have been a failure. In its aftermath the new leadership had to assess what lessons 
could be learned from this. It was deemed that the movement had become too „elitist,‟ and had 
resultantly failed to garner significant degrees of support. They resultantly applied this lesson, in 
their attempt to transform the organisation into a political movement of the people. This was 
carried out in parallel to the dismantling of the armed campaign, as is described by „Paul‟ a 
former member of the PIRA, OIRA and INLA.24     
“One of the first lessons that we learned in the Republican Movement was the failure, why 
the 56 campaign was such an abysmal failure, it was driven home to us in the 60s and the 
early 70s.  Why the 56 campaign failed is because the Republican Movement had become 
isolated from the people, had become divorced from the people, had become elitist, had 
become obsessed with ending partition and had turned a blind eye to issues like 
unemployment and poverty and emigration and bad housing.  They had turned their eye 
towards this abstract notion of a 32 County Republic with no idea what that society should 
offer the Irish people.  The Republican Movement of the 1960s was addressing that failure 
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on the part of the Movement and addressing it very effectively.  But at the same time the 
military wing was being diluted to such an extent that they were not able to defend the 
nationalist people in August 69.”25 
By changing so much at the one time, both in their political and paramilitary strategies, this was 
one of the key factors which led to the ultimate split in 1969/70, which saw the formation of the 
PIRA. This itself in turn became a future lesson, from which the future Provisional leadership 
themselves learned from. They acknowledged that the 1960s leadership had tried to change too 
much too soon, in their quest for politicisation. They applied this lesson by being more gradual in 
any changes they made. Therefore they maintained the armed struggle of the PIRA, as Sinn Féin 
in parallel was gradually becoming a more politicised party. This is a point acknowledged by 
those in favour of the politicisation, as well as those opposed to it, such as deceased dissident 
leader Ruari O‟Bradaigh.26 
“Number one the Provos27 had learned from the mistakes the Stickies28 had made and they 
didn‟t put forward the three parliaments they put forward the one, number two they insisted 
that they were keeping the war going, and that was regarded by many people, including the 
lady I was speaking to this week as the engine of the whole thing.”29 
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Through the application of these lessons, the Provisional Movement has now reached the fully 
politicised position it is now in. The success of these applied lessons can be seen in the fact that, 
unlike those leaders of the 1960s, the Provisional leadership has successfully brought the vast 
majority of the membership and support along with them on their political journey. They avoided 
major splits similar to 1969/70. However, along the way they did lose small groups of 
individuals, who now form the most significant threat to peace in Northern Ireland. Those small 
few who split away now form the VDR groups, who like their Provisional predecessors are 
learning the lessons of the past.   
The Bombs Heard Around the Globe 
The process of terrorist learning is not a one-way street. Across time, there are numerous 
examples of international terrorist organisations learning from Irish Republican groups, either 
directly or indirectly. One of the most famous cases of this can be seen with the alleged 
involvement of three PIRA members in the training of FARC guerrillas in Columbia in 2002.30 
However, it is not only the traditional left-wing ethno-nationalist groups who have learned 
lessons from Irish republican terrorists. At the beginning of the on-going insurgencies in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being used by the Taliban and 
others displayed a distinct similarity to those that had previously appeared on the streets of 
Northern Ireland. It is believed that the devices and bombing techniques were transferred to the 
Taliban through Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who themselves had learned the techniques through groups 
such as the PLO and Hizbollah, who had previously trained with the PIRA in Lebanon.31 It 
appears that this trend is now being reversed. No longer are the Middle-Eastern insurgents 
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learning from the PIRA. The VDR groups now appear to be learning from their contemporaries 
in the Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. 
In early 2015 the Assistant Chief Constable of the PSNI, Will Kerr, warned that there had been a 
recent upsurge in the capabilities of the VDR groups. Their weaponry and bomb-making 
techniques were becoming more advanced. It is believed that much of this growing expertise was 
due to the re-engagement of expert bomb-makers from the Provisional campaign of the Troubles. 
But this was now being supplemented by the online learning of IED skills, obtained from 
Islamist movements across the world.  
“Some of this technology has been tried and tested in Afghanistan and Iraq as there is some 
open source material you can see as to how these devices are constructed. There is no 
doubt that some of these dissident groups have looked at the IED development 
internationally. In terms of either meeting others in Iraq or Afghanistan or simply looking 
along the Internet I would say it was more the latter.”32 
In his interview Kerr made particular reference to the advanced capabilities of the VDR groups‟ 
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), which had been used to target PSNI officers. It was noted 
that these EFPs were „far more effective‟ that the PIRA equivalent, the projected recoilless 
improvised grenade (PRIG).33 In November 2014 the IRA/New IRA, in their targeting of a PSNI 
patrol in north Belfast, used one such EFP. No one was injured or killed in this attack, but it 
demonstrated the group‟s growing capabilities. The homemade EFP was designed as a shoulder 
held „drop and go‟ weapon, to allow for ease of escape from the scene of attack. While this could 
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be considered as a „failed attack,‟ it did demonstrate the growing sophistication of the arsenal 
available to the group.    
The development of these and other weapons are being used not just for devastation. They are 
also propaganda and recruitment tools. By demonstrating the advancement in not just their 
weaponry, but they weapons-making techniques, the dissidents are saying to potential and 
existing members that they have the capability to launch a significant armed campaign. They are 
saying that they can be trusted, to bring the fight to the security forces in Northern Ireland. They 
are both willing and able to reignite the armed campaign against the British presence in Ireland. 
As much was stated in the claim of responsibility after the November 2014 attack.  
“Volunteers from our Belfast Brigade fired a homemade rocket launcher striking an 
armoured PSNI military vehicle. Despite being heavily armed the PSNI fled the scene. The 
IRA will continue to increase its military attacks on state forces. Our capacity to target 
state forces is increasing and developing. As a result we will continue to target them at a 
time of our choosing.”34  
This was further emphasised by the subsequent picture of a member of their organisation posing 
with the weapon. The utility and promotion of these weapons can and does endorse the military 
capabilities of the organisation, as was similarly observed by Jackson in his analysis of 
organisational learning in the PIRA. He similarly noted the use of pictorial evidence, to promote 
the advancement of PIRA weaponry, with particular reference to the PRIG.35 
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Copying to be Dissident 
While there are many lessons being learned from international conflicts, the majority of the 
dissidents‟ strategic and tactical decisions have developed through their analysis of their own 
history. The lessons of their Provisional past are being applied to their dissident present. Some of 
these internal lessons, tactical, strategic and organisational, will be analysed here. Throughout 
the assessment it is important to question what the groups are attempting to achieve at each 
stage. The VDR groups are not just carrying out attacks in order to achieve maximum 
destruction, or to bring them closer to a united Ireland. As was intimated above, the groups are 
constantly aiming to legitimise their independent existence from mainstream republicanism. 
They are aiming to demonstrate that their campaign is worth supporting and joining. In order to 
do this groups have had to differentiate themselves, from both the Provisionals and their 
dissident rivals. They need to show how their approach, in seeking a united Ireland, will be 
different to their ideological rivals. This was emphasised by a leading member of the RIRA, 
describing the aspirations of the leadership at the birth of the group in the late 1990s. 
“We urged members that they must kill a British soldier face to face, no sniper, with a gun 
as the Provos hadn‟t done that in years and this would prove that they were different.”36   
In the aftermath of a split, the new dissident organisation must differentiate themselves from the 
parent group they are moving away from. It is only when they achieve this that they can justify 
their independent existence. This is exactly what is being proposed in the above quote. The 
leadership acknowledged that they needed to differentiate themselves from the Provisionals, 
from whom they were splitting. This differentiation was not to create a whole new way of 
waging a terrorist war against „British occupation‟ of Northern Ireland. Their aim was to reach 
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into the past, to a time when they believed that the paramilitary republican campaign was more 
effective and popular than it was at the end of the twentieth century. They were copying to be 
different. Different from the politicised Provisionals, and different from their dissident rivals. 
The origins of the RIRA did not see the group kill a British solider „face to face.‟ The 
organisation was almost decimated in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing of 1998. This attack 
on the nationalist market town was the most lethal attack of the entirety of the Troubles. A total 
of twenty-nine people were killed, and more than two hundred were injured. In the aftermath the 
leadership of the new organisation were arrested, and many others disengaged as a result of 
counter-terrorist crackdown on VDR actors. But many also left due to their disillusionment with 
the trajectory of the new group.37 The early twenty-first century was a time of sporadic activity 
for the group. Their campaign of dissident violence was never able to take hold, and resultantly 
they deemed it necessary to restructure and reassess the strategy of the organisation.38 When they 
decided to re-launch their campaign in 2007, they once again aimed to prove that they were 
different. In 2009 they did just that. They did something that the „Provos‟ had not done in years. 
They killed two British soldiers, face to face in the Massereene Barracks attacks. Through this 
attack they were saying to their enemies, but also their membership and support, that they were 
to be taken seriously. They were capable and willing, to once again take the „war‟ directly to the 
British security establishment. By carrying out this attack they were no longer only suggesting 
that they were different from the Provisionals. They were also now demonstrating that this new 
incarnation of the RIRA was different from the original organisation. In doing so they were once 
again trying to attract the support of those republicans, who had either left the organisation, or 
whose support and faith in the political solution of the Provisionals was dwindling. They were 
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now saying that they were not only doing things differently from Sinn Féin, but that they were 
different from their former selves. They had learned from the mistakes and failings of their past. 
Localised Learning 
Upon assessment of the tactical choices of the VDR groups the re-emergence of some significant 
forms of attack, which have not been utilised since the Troubles, are apparent. Two of the most 
striking of these are the proxy and letter/parcel bombing campaigns of recent years. The proxy 
bomb was also utilised in a short-lived PIRA campaign, of the early 1990s. This involved 
paramilitaries forcing non-members to drive to army checkpoints, and other PIRA targets, with 
bombs in their cars. Often times this was taking place, while their family members were being 
held hostage. Upon reaching the target destination, the bombs were remotely detonated by 
members of the PIRA. The most regular victim of these bombings was not the security services 
targeted, but the „human bombs,‟ who were often times tied into the vehicle. The selection of 
these people, all from the Catholic nationalist communities, was justified as they were accused 
by the paramilitaries as being collaborators with the security forces. The Provisionals brought 
this brutal form of violence to an end, after the Catholic Church and the wider nationalist 
community put them under significant pressure.39  
This ruthless tactic has seen a re-emergence in recent years. Between 2010 and 2015 there were 
seven high profile cases of attempted proxy bombings, carried out by VDR groups. None of 
these resulted in fatalities, for either the proxy bombers or the target they were ordered to drive 
to. However, it does demonstrate the intent of the groups to utilise this method to attack their 
intended victims. This tactic has been most widely used by the IRA/New IRA. Unlike the 
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Provisionals of the 1990s, the dissidents are not justifying the selection of proxies by accusing 
them of being collaborators or informers. The people they are forcing to carry the bombs are 
citizens, working within the republican areas of Northern Ireland. They are bus, van and taxi 
drivers whose vehicles have been ambushed by the paramilitaries. This suggests that the proxies 
themselves do not represent a symbolic target. They are being used merely as a tool of the attack. 
By using them as a transporter, this allows the terrorists to be distant from the location of attack. 
This in turn lessens the risk of arrest.  
What is most significant about the resurgence of the proxy bomb is the location and target of the 
violence. Of the seven attempted attacks that have taken place since 2010, four targeted the 
Strand Road PSNI station in Derry city, one of the most consistently attacked targets of VDR 
groups, through a variety of methods.40 This suggests the localisation of tactics, targets and 
learning. It appears that the decision was made for this form of attack to be used against this 
particular station. It does not suggest a nationalised adoption of the tactic. This indicates that 
when we are assessing the activity of a terrorist organisation, that we must not only analyse the 
national and international activities. We can achieve a more significant insight, by analysing the 
localised activity. From that localised analysis a greater understanding can be achieved. What it 
means to be a member of the IRA, and what they learn, in Derry can be very different to 
members in Belfast, Dublin, Limerick or Armagh. Resultantly what the individuals and groups 
are immediately trying to achieve through their violence and illegal activity, may also be 
different. This in turn can be manifested in significantly different forms of activity and targets of 
violence, judging by the locality. This localisation of violence and learning needs to be analysed 
further if we are to gain a more complete understanding.  
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Nationalised Learning 
Parallel to the localised proxy bombings, there has been a nationalised parcel and letter bombing 
campaign by the IRA/New IRA. The VDR data demonstrates that between 2012 and August 
2015 there have been nineteen individual letter and parcel bomb attacks. This includes both 
detonated and undetonated devices. As is displayed in Table 1 the targets of these attacks have 
been generally high profile political and security targets, in relation to both personnel and 
facilities.  
This has included the targeting of, amongst others, Chief Constable George Hamilton, former 
Chief Constable Matt Baggott, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers 
and Palace Barracks, the Northern Irish headquarters of MI5. Once more these attacks are being 
used to illustrate the intent and capabilities of the organisation, as is demonstrated in the claim of 
responsibility issued by the group in March 2010, after the targeting of two Maghaberry41 prison 
officers.     
"The IRA has the intelligence, capability, weaponry and volunteers at its disposal to take 
further actions against prison staff and management…We will not be found wanting in that 
regard."42 
The utility of letter and parcel bombs, against high profile targets, is not a new innovation. From 
Black September‟s killing of an Israeli diplomat in 1972,43 to the Animal Rights Militia‟s 
attempted attack on Margaret Thatcher in 1982,44 this has been a weapon of choice for a range of 
terrorist groups, aiming to attack otherwise hard to reach targets. The history of the PIRA has 
also witnessed the utility of this method, to attack prominent individuals and places. In the early 
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1970s, during the tenure of Edward Heath, they sent one such viable device to 10 Downing 
Street.45 Similarly in late 1979 a Provisional cell, based in Western Europe, was blamed for the 
letter bombing campaign targeting „prominent Britons.‟46 In their claim of responsibility the 
PIRA stated that the letter bombs were intended for “members of the establishment.” 47 The 
purpose of the campaign was to highlight the prisoners‟ protests for political status in the Maze 
prison,48 protests which would in turn lead to two separate mass hunger strikes by the prisoners 
the second of which saw ten participants pass away.  
The parallels between the PIRA letter bombing campaign of the 1970s, and the modern-day 
campaign of the IRA/New IRA are clear. Once again the dissidents are reaching into the annals 
of history, and are copying a tactic used by their Provisional predecessors. The aim of this tactic 
is not just to cause harm to the intended victims, or create fear in a wider audience. As any 
definition stipulates an act of terrorism, such as this, through its choices of targets and methods is 
designed to also send out a specific message.49 The targeting of prison officers is specifically 
designed to highlight what the dissidents classify as the on-going „prisoners struggle.‟ In doing 
so they are attempting to draw parallels to the historic prisoner campaigns of the 1970s and 80s. 
The utilisation of this tactic, in conjunction with statements and protests, is the dissidents‟ 
expression of their belief that the peace process and Provisional politicisation has failed. For 
them they are trying to portray that the justification of conflict of the Troubles is still present 
today. By returning to the tactics of the past they aim to illustrate the continuity of their 
grievances. This is an attempt to demonstrate their belief that the Provisionals have abandoned 
the republican struggle, and that they, the dissidents, are now obliged to carry it on. 
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The Prisoners’ Voice 
When terrorist learning is analysed it is important that the analysis does not just focus on the 
violence.50 Assessing learning in relation to violence alone portrays only part of the process. 
Terrorist groups, the world over, utilise learning in the evolution of the non-violent as well as 
their violent strategies. The VDR groups are no different. Their central aim at this stage of their 
armed existence is to gain legitimacy. It is only through this that they can develop both their 
membership and support. Post-merger the IRA/New IRA have focused much of their attention on 
their prisoner population. This has already been highlighted through the analysis of the letter 
bombing campaign, and can also be observed with the murder of prison officer David Black in 
November 2012, and more recently the murder of Adrian Ismay in 2016. The murder of Black 
was chosen as the violent launch of the new organisation. This in itself demonstrates the 
centrality of the prisoners‟ struggle, to the attempted legitimisation of the new group. Their 
actions, policies and statements ever since have consistently emphasised prison brutality, 
political status, disrespect for prisoners‟ rights and the failure of those in power to adhere to 
agreements and conventions. This has resulted in external attacks and statements. However, it 
has also seen the return of less publicised hunger strikes and no-wash protests within the prisons. 
Through these actions the prisoners are seeking to emulate the strategic „successes‟ of the PIRA 
and INLA prisoner protests of the 1970s and 80s. In the aftermath of those protests, especially 
the 1981 hunger strike, the PIRA and their political wing Sinn Féin received a significant rise in 
support.51 The dissidents are hoping for the same. They are seeking, once again, to portray the 
republican community as being unjustly victimised by the British establishment. It is their aim to 
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highlight, and fight against, this victimisation and in turn appropriate a significant proportion of 
the republican base. 
One of the tools of this prisoner-focused strategy has been the strengthening of the prisoners‟ 
voice. This is especially apparent subsequent to the 2012 merger. In the aftermath of this 
unification the dominant voice, speaking on behalf of the IRA/New IRA, has been that of the 
organisation‟s imprisoned community. There have been frequent prisoner statements released, 
primarily by the Republican Prisoners in Roe 4 of Maghaberry prison.52 The principal aim of 
these statements has been to highlight perceived injustices taking place within the prisons. 
However, intermittently the statements also comment on key issues relating to dissident 
republicanism outside of the prison walls.  
Since August 2016 these online statements have been supplemented by the creation of a new 
prisoners‟ magazine, Scairt Amach.53 This is the official publication of the Irish Republican 
Prisoners Welfare Associations (IRPWA). This organisation claims to represent the republican 
prisoners in Roe 4 Maghaberry, E3/E4 Portlaoise prison and the female republican prisoners in 
Hydebank jail; namely the IRA/New IRA prisoners.54 The publication of this magazine follows 
in a long history of republican prison writings. Most famously in the 1970s the Belfast based 
newspaper The Republican News hosted the writings of a republican prisoner, widely believed to 
be Gerry Adams, with the penname Brownie.55 At a time of significant strategic flux in the 
movement, the Brownie letters played a significant role in the debate on strategic change. These 
publications actively called into question the maintenance of the abstentionist policy;56 a strategy 
that was eventually repealed in relation to Dáil Éireann, by both the PIRA and Sinn Féin in 1986. 
The articles also critically analysed the importance and necessity of merging the military and 
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political campaigns, while also examining the role of localised vigilantism.57 The reverence in 
which the prisoner‟s are held within Irish republicanism allows for them to raise issues, 
considered too divisive by others.  
In the final two issues of Scairt Amach in 2015, the anonymous authors call into question the 
sustainability of one of the most controversial paramilitary republican tactics of all, punishment 
beatings and wider violent vigilantism. This is a tactic, which has been sustained across the eras 
of paramilitary republicanism. The VDR groups have been no different. They have continued to 
target those believed to be, or at least portrayed as, criminals and anti-social elements within the 
republican communities. Each generation of paramilitary has stated that punishment attacks are 
carried out to protect the republican communities, from drug dealing and general crime and anti-
social disorder. They portray themselves as doing the job that the police cannot and will not do. 
In turn they paint themselves as being the true community protectors. This is a tactic and 
message designed to strengthen their support, while simultaneously gaining power and control.58 
It is difficult to accurately measure the true rate of punishment attacks. However, in 2014 it was 
estimated that at least two were taking place in Northern Ireland each week.59 These attacks have 
included both beatings and shootings, and have at times led to the deaths of the victims. The 
VDR data shows that between 2007 and 2015 there have been a total of twenty-one known 
fatalities as a result of VDR activity. Ten of those killed were known criminals, or were accused 
of criminality by the VDR groups. However, the prisoners are now questioning the viability and 
success of this form of violence.   
“The division and discord which punishment attacks can engender within Republican 
communities, whether by accident or design, can sometimes further British crown forces‟ 
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counterinsurgency policies. Our young people in particular can be alienated as a result of 
an action which ironically was originally intended to protect the community of which 
youth are so crucial a part.”60 
“We agree that punishments are a brutal measure that will naturally desensitise a victim. 
We know that many victims of punishment attacks continue their criminal activities after a 
punishment has been meted out to them and we understand that when a Republican 
organisation has attacked an individual, that individual‟s loved ones are liable to become 
hostile to the Republican cause. There must be an alternative created to this cycle but that 
alternative will not be delivered by British Police on Irish soil; this same British police 
force is inextricably linked to the very root causes of conflict in this Nation.”61 
It is not every member who can openly question one of the predominant tactics or strategies of 
the organisation. However, the experiences of Brownie and others have demonstrated that the 
prisoners‟ position, and the respect in which they are held, provides an opportunity to ignite 
debate relating to strategies, tactics and the overall campaign. It is likely that the views portrayed 
in Scairt Amach and elsewhere have been influenced by the lessons learned from their 
Provisional predecessors. The VDR prisoner debate on the utility of paramilitary vigilantism is 
only at its opening stages. It must therefore be watched more closely, to assess both its evolution 
and influence. The publishing of these articles and statements will not bring an end to 
punishment attacks. This would necessitate a wider organisational, and localised cell, debate. 
This debate requires a trusted, and influential, voice to be the instigator. The prisoner voice may 
once again prove to meet the criteria. 
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Dissident Introspection 
It is clear that across numerous strategic, tactic and organisational aspects that the dissidents 
have learned from the Provisionals. They have utilised these lessons to differentiate their armed 
campaign, from the political strategy of Sinn Féin. By adopting the approaches of the past the 
groups are emphasising their distinctiveness in the republican quest for an independent Ireland. 
But, their internal learning does not stop with their assessment of the Provisionals. There has also 
been a significant amount of introspection of the dissident modus operandi.  
“We will learn from past mistakes and will strive to expand the theatre of our operations in 
line with our strategy.”62 
This has already been addressed in relation to the on-going debate about punishment attacks. 
However, the topic of introspection that has engulfed dissident republicanism in the recent past 
has been in relation to organisational fragmentation. It has been acknowledged across the groups, 
that the plethora of competing factions has significantly debilitated each group‟s quest for 
legitimisation and support.       
“Óglaigh na hÉireann call for a realignment of the Republican forces around the defence of 
the Republican position. For too long we have allowed ourselves to be fragmented, 
marginalised and isolated. This has provided succour to our enemies and has allowed our 
position to be portrayed as weak.”63 
This internalised debate was particularly vocalised by the leadership of the RIRA and their 
political wing the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM). This was especially active from 
2007 (the re-launch of the RIRA) to 2012 (the launch of the IRA/New IRA). The dominant 
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narrative, related to the assumption that the fragmentation of dissident republicanism had 
significantly contributed to the failure of any dissident organisation to gain a significant degree 
of traction, legitimisation or support. In the lead-up to the centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising 
there were continuous calls for there to be a realignment of dissident republicanism. 
“We call on all republicans to realign ourselves around the securing of achievable aims. 
We have set forth a programme to rebuild the republican movement through political 
advancement. We have proposed that commemorating 1916 should be the annual 
barometer by which we measure our success especially in the run up to its centenary in 
2016. Irish republicanism must be in a position on the occasion of this centenary to tell the 
Irish people that concrete political gains have been made toward making national 
reunification an unstoppable reality. The Proclamation is too important a document to 
condemn it to perpetual aspiration.”64 
“2011 must be a year of introspection and innovation. We must look at ourselves and 
address our failings. What went before has reached its zenith. We need to explore and 
devise new ways of getting our message across. We need to be more innovative in our 
protests. We can no longer be satisfied that our protests simply happen: they must also 
have meaningful effect.”65 
Through their organisational introspection, and the lessons they learned from this, 2012 saw the 
birth of the IRA/New IRA. The merger of the RIRA and RAAD was designed not just to develop 
a more effective terrorist movement. The conception of this group had its foundation in the need 
to legitimise violent dissident republicanism, and to present a more united voice for people to 
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trust and support. This merger brought two prominent VDR groups together, and has seen them 
launch a sporadic terrorist campaign against the PSNI, prison officers, the intelligence services 
and the wider population of Northern Ireland. Yet the VDR movement remains fragmented. 
ONH and CIRA have retained their independence. In fact as the IRA/New IRA was forming the 
CIRA was experiencing yet another splintering. This resulted in the development of a new group, 
also claiming the title of CIRA being led largely from Limerick, Fermanagh and Tyrone. This 
ostensibly took place as a consequence of debates over organisational leadership, strategic 
trajectory and opportunities for dissident mergers. However, during interviews leading members 
of both sides of this split have taken the opportunity to delegitimise the other group. The original 
CIRA took the opportunity to label those who broke away as criminals. 
“No matter what they do they‟re not Republicans, they‟re only criminals and that‟s what 
happened. They went further down that criminal road and there is no way that they will 
ever be affiliated with us or use our name.”66   
The breakaway group in turn accused the parent organisation of being controlled by an elite 
unwilling to expand the organisation. 
“It‟s being run by a clique of women. Kind of a Cumann na mBan67 clique are running it 
and [Ruairi] O‟Bradaigh had tolerated this, very much so. There was never going to be 
expansion.”68 
In their opening statement the breakaway CIRA accused leading members of the parent 
organisation of „attempting to subvert the military campaign‟ and stated that they „had allowed 
elements with the Republican Movement to engage in corruption over an extended period of 
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time.‟69 Ironically in the aftermath of the split both the paramilitary and political wings of the 
new breakaway faction have continued to call for dissident republican unity. They adhere to the 
same rhetoric, which justified the merger of the RIRA and RAAD in 2012. 
“Surely for the sake of the dead all true Republicans should join forces and honour the 
volunteers as a united and dedicated Movement.”70  
Yet in spite of their calls for unity, their organisation appears to be the most isolated of all VDR 
groups. They are criminalised by their former comrades and ignored by the remainder of the 
VDR community. Even though the rallying cries for unity may exist across many strains of 
dissident republicans the history of fragmentation and competition, and the bad blood 
accompanying it, makes it close to impossible to apply all the lessons learned from their 
ineffective past. Consequently in spite of the acknowledgement of past failures dissident 
republicanism will remain fractured and isolated, unable to mount an armed campaign of any 
sustained significance. Their presence currently forms no significant threat to the republican 
dominance of Sinn Féin.  
Conclusion 
The case of the VDR groups demonstrates to us the heterogeneity of terrorist learning. Some 
form of learning has significantly affected every aspect of the groups‟ existence. This learning 
has come from both internal and external sources. It has related to both the violent, and non-
violent activities of the groups. The modern day dissidents are utilising violent tactics and 
strategies, which have been both adopted and adapted from their republican past. This has been 
supplemented, and modernised, by learning from the advances in paramilitary weaponry from 
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the Middle East and elsewhere.71 By combining these internal and external lessons, the groups 
are attempting to portray that there is still a legitimate need for an armed struggle and that they 
have the competency to make it a success. By adopting these strategies and tactics, they are 
distancing themselves from the politicisation of Provisional republicanism. Their violence is the 
manifestation of their belief that the rationale for an armed struggle in the 20th century is still 
present in the 21st.The case of the dissidents demonstrates to us that when assessing terrorist 
learning that both violent and non-violent learning is taken into consideration. The prisoners of 
the IRA/New IRA have most recently highlighted this through their questioning of paramilitary 
vigilantism.    
This research demonstrates that the modern-day paramilitaries are adopting the strategies and 
tactics of their republican past. Consequently, those who are aiming to counter this terrorist 
threat must also be learning the lessons from the past. The VDR groups do not mount a unique 
threat. They are reminiscent of their Provisional predecessors. Therefore, the police and security 
services must utilise their in-depth understanding of Irish republican terrorism, to counter, 
prevent and predict the violent activity of the current incarnations of the IRA. It is vital that the 
security services do not lose their institutional knowledge of what worked in countering 
paramilitaries in the past, but also what did not work.  
Even though the VDR groups are not demonstrating a sustained threat to peace, they still have 
the ability to cause significant harm to the citizens of Northern Ireland. Academics72 and 
practitioners73 alike have acknowledged that 2016 especially may be the year that the VDR 
groups pose the most significant threat to Northern Irish security. Their statements and violent 
actions have indicated that the have been positioning themselves to mount a more significant 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 29 
campaign to mark the centenary of the 1916 Rising. Their recent activities suggest, that they may 
once again reach into the past to legitimise their present. This may come in the form of a one-day 
bombing blitz similar to Bloody Friday, or a protracted prisoner hunger strike designed to be 
evocative of the 1981 strike. Those countering the threat must be ready for the possibility of 
these, and other, forms of dissident activity. It is imperative, that the terrorists are not the only 
ones learning the lessons from the past. 
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Table 1: Targets of Letter Bombs (Detonated and Undetonated) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Civilian 1 1 1  3 
Prison Officer   2  2 
Police and Intelligence Personnel 
and Facilities 
 3  2 5 
Politician (British Government 
Minister) 
 1   1 
Army (Recruitment Offices)   7  7 
Civil Servant  1   1 
Overall 1 6 10 2 19 
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